

Today Ukraine, Tomorrow Taiwan? Assessing U.S. Reputation and Deterrence across International Crises

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I. Review of Reputation Literature

In the paper, we characterize literature about reputation for resolve on two dimensions. First, is the crisis scenario dyadic or triadic? Second, does the crisis scenario involve the same actors or different actors? The Cross-Crisis Reputational Deterrence (CCRD) dynamic described in the paper focuses on sequential triadic scenarios that involve a new challenger(s) and a different protégé(s) of the defender, corresponding to the bottom right cell in Figure A1.

		<u>DIADIC</u>		<u>TRIADIC</u>	
				Protégé	
				Same	Different
Challenger	Same	Does U.S. behavior in past nuclear crises with North Korea influence the likelihood that DPRK provokes another crisis? (Jackson 2016)		Do U.S. treaty commitments to the Philippines deter China from using coercion in the South China Sea? (Zhang 2019)	Did British and French responses to Germany's annexation of Czechoslovakia shape Germany's decision to invade Poland? (Press 2005)
	Different	Do Israel's actions against Syria affect Iran's policy towards Israel? (Clare and Danilovic 2010)		Do U.S. leader visits to South Korea deter future challenges from North Korea and China? (McManus 2018)	Did the U.S. response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine affect Chinese assertiveness towards Taiwan? (This Study)

Figure A1: Frameworks For Examining the Deterrent Effects of Reputation for Resolve

To look for past evidence on the deterrent effects of reputation for resolve, we identify works from four recent reviews of the academic literature on reputation in international relations: Crescenzi and Donahue (2017), Danilovic, Clare and Tucker (2020), Dafoe, Renshon and Huth (2014), and Jervis, Yarhi-Milo and Casler (2021). We compile a bibliography from the reference lists of these four articles.¹ Within the combined bibliography, we identify the set of works (articles, books, and working papers) that met two scope conditions:

1. The work is related to a state or leader's reputation for *resolve* as opposed to other forms of reputation.
2. The theory and/or empirics focus on a potential challenger's reaction to the defender's reputation building efforts (or lack thereof). This excludes pieces that focus on how domestic actors evaluate their own leader's reputation.

To categorize each work that meets our scope conditions, we ask:

- Is the primary relationship of interest *dyadic* (involving a challenger and defender) or *triadic* (involving a challenger, defender, and protégé)?
- If dyadic or triadic, does the crisis scenario involve the *same challenger(s)* or a *new challenger(s)*?
- If triadic, does the crisis scenario involve the same *protégé(s)* or a *different protégé(s)*?

¹We thank Paul Framel and Alice Shih for research assistance with this effort.

II. Survey Sample and Demographics

This survey was fielded online to a sample of 1015 adults living in mainland China from March 28-31, 2022. The survey questionnaire, hypotheses, and proposed analyses were preregistered with the OSF/EGAP Registry.² The survey was distributed to an opt-in online panel of adults via the survey firm Qualtrics. We used quota sampling to match our sample to the 2020 Chinese National Census on two target demographics: age and sex.

	Category	Target	Actual
AGE	18-34	30%	30.3%
	35-54	32%	32%
	55+	38%	37.7%
SEX	Male	48%	50.1%
	Female	52%	49.9%

While this sample matches demographic quotas on age and sex, it is not fully representative on other demographic characteristics. Comparing our survey data with the 2020 Chinese Census³, we see that relative to the national population, adults in our sample are:

- More likely to live in urban areas. In the 2020 Census, 63.89% of respondents lived in urban areas, whereas 97.4% of our sample lived in urban areas.
- Somewhat more likely to be ethnically Han. In the 2020 Census, 91.1% of the population is ethnically Han, whereas 96.8% of our population is Han.
- More likely to receive higher education. In the 2020 Census, about 15.47% of the population have college degrees, whereas 78.3% of our sample have college degrees.
- More likely to reside in North China. In the 2020 Census, the population lived in the following regions: East China (30.04%), North China (12.01%), Central and South (29.07%), Northeast (6.99%), Southwest (14.55%), and Northwest (7.34%). In our sample, the regional distribution is: East China (28.8%), North China (28.9%), Central and South (22.3%), Northeast (4.2%), Southwest (11.7%), and Northwest (3.8%).

²The preregistration is available here: <https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/G37M6>.

³Census data is from the 2020 Seventh National Population Census in China, as published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (<http://www.stats.gov.cn/>).

III. Ethics

Survey experiments involving human subjects introduce ethical issues that merit extensive discussion, particularly in authoritarian contexts like China. In designing and fielding our survey, we draw on four sets of resources: (1) informal interviews we conducted with survey researchers who focus on China⁴, (2) published research focused on best practices for survey research in China⁵, (3) guidelines from the 2020 American Political Science Association’s “Principles and Guidance for Human Subject Research” (hereafter, “2020 APSA Principles”)⁶, and (4) guidance from our university institutional review board. Prior to fielding our survey, our project was reviewed and approved through Duke University’s Campus Institutional Review Board (IRB), protocol no. 2022-0343. This section elaborates on our key ethical considerations in evaluating different trade-offs with our survey design in consultation with these resources.

Medium and Sample

Our first consideration was the choice of medium for the survey. Face-to-face (F2F) versus online surveys pose trade-offs. While online surveys tend to be less representative given that they involve an opt-in panel of respondents, they better preserve anonymity of respondents than F2F surveys and help to mitigate social desirability bias. Given that this survey was conducted in an authoritarian context, we viewed concerns about anonymity and privacy as outweighing concerns about representativeness. Therefore, we chose to field an online survey with a reputable international survey firm, Qualtrics.⁷

We inform participants that their responses will be anonymous and only used for academic research.⁸ Participants are aware of the content of the survey in advance and choose whether or not to participate. They are able to exit the survey at any time and can skip any question they prefer not to answer. Respondents are compensated for their participation in the survey at market rate, regardless of whether or not they complete all the survey questions. We also do not collect individually identifiable information from survey participants.⁹ We program the survey and partner with Qualtrics to distribute the link to members of its online panel living in China.

Questionnaire Design

In designing our questionnaire, we avoided introducing topics that could cause respondents discomfort or be politically sensitive.¹⁰ We note that issues like Taiwan and the South China Sea are openly discussed in Chinese media and prompt major public debates; they are the subject of many other surveys and survey experiments (Chubb 2019; Moore and Primiano 2020; Qi, Zhang and Lin 2022; Wang 2015; Weiss 2019; Weiss and Dafoe 2019; Wu et al. 2022; Yu 2022). Reporting and public discussion around Taiwan policy differs substantively from discussion around issues with significant censorship, such as human rights abuses in Xinjiang.¹¹ According to a *South China Morning Post* article published in November 2021, there were heated debates on China’s

⁴We especially thank the following researchers for their guidance: [ANONYMIZED]

⁵See, for example: Mei and Brown (2018); Nicholson and Huang (2022); Lei and Lu (2017); Tang (2005*b*); Jiang and Yang (2016); Manion (2008); Carlson et al. (2014).

⁶Accessed at: <https://connect.apsanet.org/hsr/principles-and-guidance/>

⁷2020 APSA Principles, “Confidentiality,” pg. 11-12.

⁸2020 APSA Principles, “Consent,” pg. 5-6.

⁹2020 APSA Principles, “Confidentiality,” pg. 11-12.

¹⁰2020 APSA Principles, “Harm and Trauma,” pg. 8-11.

¹¹Of course, this may change in the future should cross-strait tensions continue to increase.

internet over whether China should resort to military force to take over Taiwan, suggesting that open discussion of Taiwan policy is not uncommon (Mai 2021). When our survey was fielded, we have no reason to believe that asking questions about Taiwan caused respondents any distress or trauma.¹² We explained to respondents that their responses were anonymous and they could skip any question without penalty. Only 5 of 1018 respondents skipped the question about Chinese assertiveness towards Taiwan in the future.

Our next consideration was construction of treatment conditions. In the survey, respondents read a vignette that frames the U.S. response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine as either a weak (“Weak Frame”) or strong (“Strong Frame”) response. In constructing these frames, we chose not to engage in deception in the form of misinformation.¹³ Instead, we drew from news sources that reflected the media coverage in China at the time the survey was fielded. For example, on March 30, 2022, an article published by the popular online news outlet *163.com* quoted President Biden telling U.S. soldiers in Poland, “[W]hen you guys are there...you will see the brave Ukrainian resistance...” The article interpreted the phrase “when you are there” as a signal that Biden might consider sending U.S. troops into Ukraine, concluding “the possibility of the U.S. sending troops still exists.”¹⁴ In contrast, a different article reporting on Biden’s visit to Poland published by *Sohu* (another major online news provider) concluded that the U.S. had no intention of sending troops to Ukraine.¹⁵ This means that the frames are not perfectly parallel but rather reflect realistic reporting in China about the U.S. response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

While we do not engage in deception in our survey, our IRB submission requested to waive one element of informed consent: disclosure of our university affiliation prior to the survey.¹⁶ Our concern was that respondents may not be truthful in their answers if they are aware that survey was being conducted by researchers based at U.S. universities. In addition to concerns about potential non-response bias, respondents could exaggerate their unfavorability towards U.S. foreign policy if they perceived the survey to be affiliated with a U.S. institution. Omitting institutional affiliation in the informed consent declaration is consistent with best practices in recent survey research conducted in China related to politics and international relations.¹⁷

Behavioral Implications

Our final—and most important—ethical concern was any behavioral implications of the survey experiment.¹⁸ In designing our outcome variable, we take two considerations into account. First, we opt not to ask directly about support for use of military force to mitigate any ethical concerns around increasing public support for use of force.¹⁹ Instead, we ask respondents about general foreign policy orientation: whether China should be more or less assertive in its policy towards Taiwan in the future. Second, we frame the outcome as prospective rather than as a direct evalu-

¹²2020 APSA Principles, “Harm and Trauma,” pg. 8-11.

¹³According to the 2020 APSA Principles, *misinformation* is “providing false information about the state of the world” (p. 7).

¹⁴Accessed at: <https://www.163.com/dy/article/H3NG0KN40534NAKY.html>

¹⁵Accessed at: https://mil.sohu.com/a/533560669_120046968

¹⁶We consider this to be a variant of *identity deception* (2020 APSA Principles, pg. 7). We disclose that we are researchers and provide contact information but do not disclose our U.S.-based university affiliation.

¹⁷See, for example, Gruffydd-Jones (2019); ?; Weiss and Dafoe (2019).

¹⁸2020 APSA Principles, “Impact,” pg. 13-17.

¹⁹We note, however, that comparable surveys in the U.S. often use support for the use of military force as a key dependent variable.

ation of the regime's policy given concerns about social desirability bias in this context (see, e.g., Robinson and Tannenberg 2018).

However, we also had strong prior beliefs that that our treatment would not affect overall attitudes towards China's policy towards Taiwan. This belief was confirmed by our survey results. In weighing costs and benefits of knowledge we would gain from this experiment, we feel that the policy implications of null results are important. As discussed in our paper, transferability of reputation arguments have historically been used to justify the use of military force in U.S. foreign policy (Hopf 1994; Press and Lind 2013; Tang 2005*a*). Therefore, we see considerable benefit in providing causal evidence about the limitations of CCRD arguments.

IV. Survey Questionnaire

The survey questionnaire was distributed in Chinese (English translation in italics). The questionnaire contains three parts: (a) demographic questions, (b) general questions about perceptions of U.S. and Chinese foreign policy, and (c) the framing experiment about U.S. response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The analysis in this paper focuses on (c), the framing experiment.

A. Demographic Questions

consent_text:

You are invited to participate in a study about your attitudes towards American foreign policy and Chinese foreign policy. Your participation will take approximately 10-15 minutes.

我们邀请您参加此次问卷调查。此问卷旨在了解您对于美国外交政策和中國外交政策的看法。完成此次问卷大约需要10-15分钟。

The data collected from this survey is collected by university researchers and will only be used for academic research. Your answers will be confidential. We will not ask for your name or any information that might identify you.

调查结果将会被大学研究员收集，并将只用于学术目的。我们不会询问您的姓名或其他任何可能确认您身份的信息。

Your participation is completely voluntary. You may choose to skip questions or not participate in the study or to withdraw at any time. In order to receive compensation for participating in this study, you must proceed to the final screen of the survey.

参见本次调查完全基于自愿。您可以拒绝参见本调查，或者在调查中的任何时候选择退出。如果您完成了本次调查，您会收到指定数额的奖励。

If you have any questions, you may contact the researchers at: zmyj@yahoo.com

如果您对本研究有任何问题，请联系：zmyj@yahoo.com

Do you agree to these terms?

- Yes / No

您是否同意以上条款？

- 是/否

If respondents consent to participating in the survey, they next answer a series of demographic questions.

sex: *What is your sex?*

- Male / Female

sex: 您的性别是?

- 男/女

age: *What is your age?*

age: 您的年龄是?

income: *What is your annual household income?*

- *Less than 10,000 CNY / 10,000 CNY – 50,000 CNY / 50,000 CNY – 100,000 CNY / 100,000 CNY – 150,000 CNY / 150,000 CNY – 200,000 CNY / 200,000 CNY – 300,000 CNY / 300,000 CNY – 500,000 CNY / 500,000 CNY – 1,000,000 CNY / More than 1,000,000 CNY / Prefer not to answer*

income: 您家庭年收入的范围是多少?

- 1万元人民币以下/ 1万到5万元人民币之间/ 5万到10万元人民币之间/ 10万到15万元人民币之间/ 15万到20万元人民币之间/ 20万到30万元人民币之间/ 30万到50万元人民币之间/ 50万到100万元人民币之间/ 100万元人民币以上/ 选择不回答

household: *What is the number of household members in your house including children?*

- *1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 or more*

household: 您的家庭成员有几人 (包括子女)?

- 1人/ 2人/ 3人/ 4人/ 5人或者以上

intaffairs: *How much time on average do you spend each day on reading news about international affairs?*

- *None / Less than 30 minutes / 30 minutes to an hour / More than an hour*

intaffairs: 您平均每天花费多长时间阅读有关国际事务的新闻?

- 从不/ 少于30分钟/ 30分钟到1个小时/ 1个小时以上

intaffairs_source: *From which of the following news sources do you often get information about international affairs? (Select all that apply)*

- *Domestic internet / International internet / Local TV news / National TV news / Local radio news broadcasts / National radio news broadcasts / City newspapers / Provincial newspapers / National newspapers / Little papers [xiaobao] / Printed magazines*

intaffairs_source: 您从以下哪些新闻来源获取有关国际事务的信息? (请选择所有适用选项)

- 国内网站/ 国际网站/ 地方电视新闻/ 央视新闻/ 地方广播电台/ 中央广播电台/ 地方报纸/ 省市级报纸/ 国家级报纸/ 小报/ 印刷杂志

intaffairs_primary: *Among the following news sources, which one do you rely on most to get information about international affairs? (Select only one)*

- *Domestic internet / International internet / Local TV news / National TV news / Local radio news broadcasts / National radio news broadcasts / City newspapers / Provincial newspapers / National newspapers / Little papers [xiaobao] / Printed magazines*

intaffairs_primary: 您最依赖于以下哪个新闻来源获取有关国际事务的信息？（请选择一项）

- 国内网站/ 国际网站/ 地方电视新闻/ 央视新闻/ 地方广播电台/ 中央广播电台/ 地方报纸/ 省市级报纸/ 国家级报纸/ 小报/ 印刷杂志

us_travel: *Have you traveled to the United States?*

- *Yes / No*

us_travel: 您是否曾经到过美国？

- 是/ 否

us_time: *How much time in total have you been in the United States?*

- *None / Less than one month / 1-6 months / 6-12 months / 1-3 years / More than 3 years*

us_time: 您累计在美国待过多长时间？

- 从未到过美国/ 少于1个月/ 1个月到6个月/ 6个月1年/ 1年到3年/ 3年以上

region: *Which region do you live in?*

- *Northeast (Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang) North China (Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia) Northwest (Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang) Southwest (Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet) Central and South (Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan) East China (Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong)*

region: 您居住在哪个地区？

- 东北（辽宁，吉林，黑龙江）/ 华北（北京，天津，河北，山西，内蒙古）/ 西北（陕西，甘肃，青海，宁夏，新疆）/ 西南（重庆，四川，贵州，云南，西藏）/ 中南（河南，湖北，湖南，广东，广西，海南）/ 华东（上海，江苏，浙江，安徽，福建，江西，山东）

urban: *Are you an urban or rural resident?*

- *Urban / Rural*

urban: 您居住在城市还是农村？

- 城市/ 农村

hawkish: *In general, does China rely on military strength too much, too little or about the right amount to achieve its foreign policy goals?*

- *Too much / Too little / About right / Don't know / Prefer not to answer*

hawkish: 一般来看，您认为中国在实现外交目标方面过多地依赖军事力量，过少地依赖军事，还是不多不少地依赖军事力量？

- 过多依赖/ 过少依赖/ 不多不少/ 不知道/ 选择不回答

education: *What is your highest education level?*

- *No formal education / Primary school / Junior Secondary School / Senior Secondary School (including Secondary Technical School) / College (including Junior College) / Master / Doctoral*

education: 您的最高学历是？

- 没有接受过正规教育/ 小学毕业/ 初中毕业/ 高中毕业（包括中等职业学校）/ 大学毕业（包括大专）/ 硕士/ 博士

ethnicity: *What is your ethnicity?*

- *Han / Minority / Prefer not to answer*

ethnicity: 您的民族是？

- 汉族/ 少数民族/ 选择不回答

ccp: *Do you belong to the Communist Party?*

- *Yes / No / Prefer not to answer*

ccp: 您是否是中共党员？

- 是/ 否/ 选择不回答

pol_views: *How would you describe your political views?*

- *Very conservative / Somewhat conservative / Moderate / Somewhat liberal / Very Liberal / Don't know / Prefer not to answer*

pol_views: 总的来说，您认为您的政治观点是？

- 非常保守/ 比较保守/ 温和的/ 比较开放的/ 非常开放的/ 不知道/ 选择不回答

At the end of the demographic questions, survey respondents must pass a simple attention check. Respondents who do not answer this question correctly are screened out of the survey before the experiment begins.

attn: *Many people like sports. We are checking to make sure you're reading carefully. Instead of clicking on your favorite sport, please select the third answer out of the four choices below.*

- *Basketball / Table Tennis / Football (Soccer) / Badminton*

attn: 很多人喜爱体育运动。我们想确认您是否在认真阅读本问卷。在下列选项中，不论您最喜欢的运动是什么，请选择第三个选项。

- 篮球/ 乒乓球/ 足球/ 羽毛球

B. Questions about Foreign Policy in U.S. and China

In the second part of the survey, respondents are asked general questions about their perceptions of the U.S., and the foreign policies of the U.S. and China.

us_strength: *In the next few years, do you think the United States is likely to be:*

- *Much weaker / Somewhat weaker / Neither weaker nor stronger / Somewhat stronger / Much stronger / I don't know (NA)*

us_strength: 在未来几年，您认为美国的综合国力会如何变化？

- 比现在弱很多/ 比现在弱一些/ 维持现状/ 比现在强一些/ 比现在强很多/ 不知道

us_active: *In the next few years, do you think the United States is likely to be:*

- *Much less active in global affairs / Somewhat less active in global affairs / About the same / Somewhat more active in global affairs / Much more active in global affairs*

us_active: 在未来几年，您认为美国在国际事务的参与上会：

- 在很大程度上减少参与国际事务/ 在一定程度上减少参与国际事务/ 保持不变/ 在一定程度上更积极的参与国际事务/ 在很大程度上更积极的参与国际事务

us_active_conf: *How confident are you about your answer to the previous question?*

- *Slider Bar: 0 (Not at All Confident) to 100 (Completely Confident)*

us_active_conf: 对于上一个问题中您所做出的预测，您有多大的把握？

- 0 (完全没有信心) to 100 (完全有信心)

us_assertive: *In the next few years, do you think U.S. foreign policy towards China is likely to be:*

- *Much less assertive / Somewhat less assertive / About the same / Somewhat assertive / Much more assertive*

us_assertive: 在未来几年，您认为美国对待中国的外交政策会：

- 在很大程度上有所缓和/ 在一定程度上有所缓和/ 保持不变/ 在一定程度上更加强硬/ 在很大程度上更加强硬

us_assertive_conf: *How confident are you about your answer to the previous question?*

- *Slider Bar: 0 (Not at All Confident) to 100 (Completely Confident)*

us_assertive_conf: 对于上一个问题中您所做出的预测，您有多大的把握？

- 0 (完全没有信心) to 100 (完全有信心)

china_assertive: *In the next few years, do you think Chinese foreign policy towards the United States should be:*

- *Much less assertive / Somewhat less assertive / About the same / Somewhat more assertive / Much more assertive*

china assertive: 在未来的几年中，您认为中国对待美国的外交政策应该：

- 在很大程度上有所缓和/ 在一定程度上有所缓和/ 保持不变/ 在一定程度上更加强硬/ 在很大程度上更加强硬

In your opinion, in the next few years, when competing with the United States on the following issues, should Chinese foreign policy be:

	<i>Much less assertive</i>	<i>Somewhat less assertive</i>	<i>About the same</i>	<i>Somewhat more assertive</i>	<i>Much more assertive</i>
<i>Taiwan</i>					
<i>South China Sea</i>					
<i>Cybersecurity</i>					
<i>Trade and Supply Chain</i>					
<i>Global Leadership</i>					
<i>Outerspace</i>					

在未来几年中，同美国在下列事务的博弈中，您认为中国应该：

	在很大程 度上有所 缓和	在一定程 度上有所 缓和	保持不变	在一定程 度上更加 强硬	在很大程 度上更加 强硬
台湾					
南中国海					
网络安全					
贸易与供应链					
全球领导力					
外太空					

On a new screen, respondents see two more matrix questions with the same six issues. They are asked: “*In your opinion, how important are the following issues for China?*” [您认为下列事务对中国的重要性是多少?] and *In your opinion, how important are the following issues for the United States?*” [您认为下列事务对美国的重要性是多少?] Participants rate the importance of each issue on a 5-point Likert scale with 1 indicating “Not Important at All” and 5 indicating “Very Important.”

C. Framing Experiment

In the third part of the survey, which is the focus of this paper, we embed a framing experiment about the U.S. response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine:

transition text: *We are now going to ask you to read about a foreign policy issue based on recent news reports. Please read the text carefully as you will be asked questions about it. When you are ready, click next to continue.*

transition_text: 我们现在需要您阅读最近新闻中关于外交政策的一些报道。请仔细阅读这些信息，因为之后您需要回答与之相关的问题。如果您已准备好，请点击下一步。

The respondent is randomly assigned to one of two conditions: a “Weak Frame” condition (**russia_frame_weak**) or a “Strong Frame” condition (**russia_frame_strong**).

russia_frame_weak:

- *Over the last few months, tensions between the United States and Russia have increased as Russian President Vladimir Putin launched an offensive military attack against Ukraine.*
- *The Russian army advanced into the country, but it remains unclear if Russia will fully occupy Ukraine.*
- *The U.S. response to the crisis has been very weak. U.S. President Joe Biden has condemned Russia’s actions and issued sanctions, but they haven’t stopped Russian aggression.*
- *President Biden also withdrew U.S. military troops from Ukraine at the beginning of the conflict and made it clear that the United States would not use military force to defend Ukraine.*

russia_frame_weak:

- 在过去的几个月中，由于俄罗斯总统普京下令对乌克兰发动军事进攻，美国与俄罗斯之间的紧张关系加剧。
- 俄罗斯军队已经进入乌克兰境内，但是仍然不清楚俄罗斯是否会全面占领乌克兰。
- 美国对此的反应很软弱。美国总统拜登谴责了俄罗斯的行为并宣布制裁，但是这些措施并没有成功阻止俄罗斯的进攻。
- 在冲突开始时拜登总统还下令从乌克兰撤出美军，并且明言美国不会军事介入协防乌克兰。

russia_frame_strong:

- *Over the last few months, tensions between the United States and Russia have increased as Russian President Vladimir Putin launched an offensive military attack against Ukraine.*
- *The Russian army advanced into the country, but it remains unclear if Russia will fully occupy Ukraine.*
- *The U.S. response to the crisis has been very strong. U.S. President Joe Biden strongly condemned Russia’s actions and issued harsh diplomatic and economic sanctions.*
- *President Biden also has moved U.S. troops into other countries in the region and has been providing extensive military assistance to defend Ukraine.*

russia_frame_strong:

- 在过去的几个月中，由于俄罗斯总统普京下令对乌克兰发动军事进攻，美国与俄罗斯之间的紧张关系加剧。
- 俄罗斯军队已经进入乌克兰境内，但是仍然不清楚俄罗斯是否会全面占领乌克兰。
- 美国对此的反应很强硬。美国总统拜登对俄罗斯的行为进行了强烈地谴责，并宣布了非常严厉的外交及经济制裁。
- 拜登总统还下令向该地区其他国家增派美军，并且为乌克兰提供了大量的军事援助。

[NEW SCREEN]

credibility_opinion: *In your opinion, has the U.S. response to Russia been strong or weak?*

- *Very strong / Somewhat strong / Somewhat weak / Very weak / I don't know*

credibility_opinion: 在您看来，美国对俄罗斯的反应是？

- 非常强硬/ 比较强硬/ 比较软弱/ 非常软弱/ 不知道

[NEW SCREEN]

us_reliable: *In your opinion, how reliable or unreliable do you think the United States is as a partner in international politics?*

- *Very unreliable / Somewhat unreliable / Somewhat reliable / Very reliable / I don't know*

us_reliable: 您认为在国际政治中，美国在多大程度上是一个可靠伙伴？

- 非常不可靠/ 比较不可靠/ 比较可靠/ 非常可靠/ 不知道

us_resolve: *In your opinion, how likely is the United States to stand firm in an international crisis?*

- *Very unlikely / Somewhat unlikely / Somewhat likely / Very likely / I don't know*

us_resolve: 您认为在国际冲突中，美国坚定不妥协的可能性是？

- 非常不可能/ 比较不可能/ 比较可能/ 非常可能/ 不知道

[NEW SCREEN]

us_taiwan_punish: *In your opinion, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the U.S. would impose harsh punishments against China if China decides to unify Taiwan with military force?*

- *Very unlikely / Somewhat unlikely / Somewhat likely / Very likely / I don't know*

us_taiwan_punish: 在您看来，如果中国动用武力统一台湾，美国会对中国实施严厉惩罚的可能性是？

- 非常不可能/ 比较不可能/ 比较可能/ 非常可能/ 不知道

us_taiwan_defend: *In your opinion, how likely or unlikely do you think that the U.S. would defend Taiwan if China decides to unify Taiwan with military force?*

- *Very unlikely / Somewhat unlikely / Somewhat likely / Very likely / I don't know*

us_taiwan_defend: 在您看来，如果中国动用武力统一台湾，美国会军事协防台湾的可能性是？

- 非常不可能/ 比较不可能/ 比较可能/ 非常可能/ 不知道

[NEW SCREEN]

china_taiwan: *In your opinion, in its policy towards Taiwan, China should be:*

- *Much less assertive / Somewhat less assertive / About the same / Somewhat more assertive / Much more assertive*

china_taiwan: 您认为在处理台湾事务中，中国应该：

- 在很大程度上有所缓和/ 在一定程度上有所缓和/ 保持不变/ 在一定程度上更加强硬/ 在很大程度上更加强硬

[NEW SCREEN]

ukr_taiwan: *Many experts today are debating whether the current Ukraine crisis could resemble a future Taiwan crisis. In your opinion, do you think the Ukraine situation and the Taiwan situation are:*

- *Similar / Different / Don't Know*

ukr_taiwan: 现在有很多专家在争论今天的乌克兰危机是否会未来台海危机的预演。在您看来，乌克兰的情况和台湾的情况是？

- 相似的/ 不同的/ 不知道

[THEN BRANCH]

[IF SIMILAR....]

ukr_similar: *What do you think is similar about the Ukraine situation and the Taiwan situation?*

[OPEN TEXT]

ukr_similar: 您认为乌克兰的情况和台湾情况的相似点是什么？

[OPEN TEXT]

[IF DIFFERENT]

ukr_different: *What do you think is different about the Ukraine situation and the Taiwan situation?*

ukr_different: 您认为乌克兰的情况和台湾的情况不同点是什么？

At the end of the survey, we ask respondents how they interpreted the translation of the word “assertive” throughout the survey.

assertive_def: *We used the word “assertive” a lot in this survey and we want to know how respondents interpret this word. What do you think best describes a more assertive Chinese foreign policy?*

- *Defend China's interests more resolutely. / Defend China's interests more actively. / Defend China's interests more aggressively. / Expand China's influence more resolutely. / Expand China's influence more actively. / Expand China's influence more aggressively. / Don't know*

assertive_def: 在本次问卷中我们多次提及“强硬”一词。我们想了解您是如何理解该词的。在下列选项中，您认为最能准确描述更加强硬的中国外交政策的一项是？

- 在维护中国利益方面更加坚定/ 在维护中国利益方面更加积极/ 在维护中国利益方面更加具有攻击性/ 在拓展中国影响力方面更加坚定/ 在拓展中国影响力方面更加积极/ 在拓展中国影响力方面更加具有攻击性/ 不知道

V. Pre-Registration Information

This appendix contains our pre-analysis plan registered with OSF/EGAP on March 18, 2022 before our survey was fielded. The pre-registration also included a copy of the survey questionnaire in Appendix IV. Section A displays the text of the pre-analysis plan. Section B discusses how the theoretical framework in the final paper differs from the pre-analysis plan based on feedback we received in the peer review process at International Studies Quarterly.

A. Text of Pre-Analysis Plan

Description

Is a state's reputation "transferable" from one international crisis to another? This project links academic debates about reputation and resolve in international politics to a contested policy debate about U.S. response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. We explore whether and how the U.S. government's response to an ongoing crisis—the Russian invasion of Ukraine—impacts China's assessments of its relationship with Taiwan. In a framing experiment fielded in China, we manipulate whether or not the U.S. response to Russian aggression in Ukraine is framed as a "weak" or "strong" response. We then investigate how these frames affect Chinese perceptions of U.S. reliability and resolve, as well as their assessments of U.S.-Taiwan and China-Taiwan relations.

Background and explanation of rationale

In international politics, an actor's "reputation" reflects beliefs about their "persistent characteristics or tendencies based on that actor's past behavior, which will influence what he or she does in the future" (Jervis et al. 2020). Much scholarship on reputation in international relations debates the extent to which a leader or state's reputation is "transferable" from one context to another (see, for example, Crescenzi 2007, 2018; Harvey Mitton 2016; Mercer 1996; Press 2005; Van Jackson 2016; Weisiger Yarhi-Milo 2015; Wiegend 2011; Yarhi-Milo 2018). When applied to interstate crisis behavior, the "transferability of reputation" model (or ToR model, for short) implies that a state's "weak" response to a security crisis will increase doubts about its willingness to stand firm in future crises. In turn, adversaries will be more likely to provoke or challenge that state in the future.

This project evaluates the ToR model with application to two contemporary cases: the U.S.-Russia-Ukraine relationship and the U.S.-China-Taiwan relationship. In early 2022, as Russia amassed military troops on the Ukrainian border in preparation for invasion, analysts projected that Chinese officials would make inferences about U.S. credibility and resolve based on how the U.S. responded to the crisis. Following the ToR logic, these experts argued that a "weak" U.S. response to Russian aggression in Ukraine would make China doubt U.S. resolve to defend Taiwan in a future crisis scenario (e.g., Myers and Quinn 2022; Milman 2021). Other experts argued these arguments oversimplified the parallels between these two scenarios, noting that the U.S.-Russia-Ukraine relationship was unlikely to impact U.S.-China-Taiwan relations (e.g., Browne 2022; Templeman 2022; Manning 2022).

This project directly tests the ToR model and its underlying assumptions using a framing experiment embedded in an online survey of Chinese adults. We present adults information about how the U.S. responded to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In the descriptive vignette, we randomize whether the U.S. response is framed as "weak" or "strong." We then assess whether this framing impacts how the Chinese public assesses U.S. reliability, resolve, and willingness to

defend Taiwan in response to military action.

Due to the time sensitive nature of the project (we are fielding the survey as the Russia-Ukraine crisis is unfolding), we are submitting an abbreviated preregistration that focuses on outlining our hypotheses, describing the experimental design, and explaining how the core hypotheses will be tested. A survey questionnaire is appended to this registration.

What are the hypotheses and/or quantities of interest to be estimated?

This survey experiment tests the transferability of reputation (ToR) model and three assumptions underlying that argument with application to two triadic relationships: U.S.-Russia-Ukraine and U.S.-China-Taiwan.

The key testable implication of the ToR model is that:

ToR Hypothesis: A weaker U.S. response to Russian aggression in Ukraine should make the Chinese public believe that China should be more assertive towards Taiwan.

If our experiment finds mixed or limited evidence for the ToR model, we argue this is likely because one or more of three underlying assumptions of this model are problematic when applied to our cases of interest.

Assumption 1: The first assumption of the ToR model is that other actors substantively update their assessment of a state's reputation based on its response to a recent crisis. In practice, this often means that reputational impacts from a recent crisis must outweigh information about how that state has behaved in other crises in the past. In our application, this assumption anticipates that U.S. response to Russian invasion of Ukraine would substantively impact the Chinese public's assessments of U.S. reliability and resolve. This assumption may not hold if the Chinese public already has strong priors about the U.S.

Assumption 2: The second assumption of the ToR model is that other actors view the context in which the current crisis unfolded as highly comparable to future potential crisis. In our application, this assumption anticipates that the Chinese public views the U.S.-Russia-Ukraine relationship as substantively similar to the U.S.-China-Taiwan relationship. This assumption may not hold if the Chinese public thinks that the U.S. has different economic or geopolitical interests in Taiwan relative to Ukraine, or if they believe other elements of the Ukraine crisis (i.e., state sovereignty) differ from a potential Taiwan crisis. This assumption may also not hold if the Chinese public thinks that the U.S.-China relationship is substantively different from the U.S.-Russia relationship, which could in turn affect expectations about U.S. policy towards China.

Assumption 3: The third assumption of the ToR model is that a state's foreign policy position on a given issue must be substantively impacted by expectations about how adversaries behave. This assumption anticipates that if the Chinese public perceives the U.S. as less likely to defend Taiwan, they will, on average, become more aggressive towards Taiwan. This assumption may not hold when policy preferences about China-Taiwan relations are relatively fixed and/or largely independent of assessments of U.S. response.

How will these hypotheses be tested?

SURVEY DESIGN

To test the hypotheses, we will embed a framing experiment on an omnibus public opinion survey fielded online to a sample of 1000-1500 adults in China. Survey respondents will be recruited by a professional firm called Qualtrics, which maintains an opt-in online panel of Chinese adult internet users. The sample will be representative of the Chinese population based on target demographics of age and gender from the 2020 Chinese national census. We will also collect other demographic information about respondents, including their education, income, household size, and ethnicity in order to benchmark our results to two different populations: (1) the population of adult Internet users in mainland China, and (2) the population of all adults in mainland China.

There are three components to the survey. First, respondents answer demographic questions, which include the characteristics mentioned above as well as basic questions about their interest in international affairs, experience in the U.S., and political attitudes. To ensure attentiveness, respondents must pass two attention checks pre-treatment in order to continue taking the survey.

Next, both sets of respondents read a vignette about how U.S. President Joe Biden responded to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. For half of the respondents, the U.S. response will be framed as "weak." Respondents will be told that the U.S. has issued sanctions but they haven't deterred Russian aggression. Respondents in the "weak frame" are also told that the U.S. withdrew military troops from Ukraine and made it clear that they would not use military force to defend Ukraine. For the other half of respondents, the U.S. response will be framed as "strong." Respondents will be told that the U.S. has issued extremely harsh diplomatic and economic sanctions against Russia and sent U.S. troops to other countries in the region. Respondents are also told that the U.S. has provided extensive military assistance to defend Ukraine. Importantly, the information in both of these vignettes is factually correct, but the different frames give contrasting assessments of the relative strength of President Biden's response to the crisis. After reading the vignettes, respondents will receive a manipulation check that asks whether the respondent thinks that the U.S. response to Russia has been strong or weak.

In the third component of the survey, respondents answer a series of outcome questions. There are three sets of outcomes. The first set of outcomes asks about general evaluations of U.S. reputation.

US_RELIABLE: In your opinion, how reliable or unreliable do you think the United States is as a partner in international politics? [Very unreliable (1) / Somewhat unreliable (2) / Somewhat reliable (3) / Very reliable (4) / I don't know (NA)]

US_RESOLVE: In your opinion, how likely or unlikely is the United States to stand firm in an international crisis? [Very unlikely (1) / Somewhat unlikely (2) / Somewhat likely (3) / Very likely (4) / I don't know (NA)]

The second set of outcomes asks about U.S. and China's policy towards Taiwan.

US_TAIWAN_PUNISH: In your opinion, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the U.S. would impose harsh punishments against China if China decides to unify Taiwan with military force? [Very unlikely (1) / Somewhat unlikely (2) / Somewhat likely (3) / Very likely (4) / I don't

know (NA)]

US_TAIWAN_DEFEND: In your opinion, how likely or unlikely do you think that the U.S. would defend Taiwan if China decides to unify Taiwan with military force? [Very unlikely (1) / Somewhat unlikely (2) / Somewhat likely (3) / Very likely (4) / I don't know (NA)]

CHINA_TAIWAN: In your opinion, in its policy towards Taiwan, China should be: [Much less assertive (1) / Somewhat less assertive (2) / About the same (3) / Somewhat more assertive (4) / Much more assertive (5)]

The third set of outcomes asks respondents about the similarities between the Ukraine crisis and a future crisis involving Taiwan:

UKR_TAIWAN: Many experts today are debating whether the current Ukraine crisis could resemble a future Taiwan crisis. In your opinion, do you think the Ukraine situation and the Taiwan situation are: [Similar (1) / Different (0) / Don't Know (NA)]

Respondents who answer either similar or different are branched into one of the two follow open-ended questions, depending on the answer they selected:

UKR_SIMILAR: What do you think is similar about the Ukraine situation and the Taiwan situation? [OPEN TEXT]

UKR_DIFFERENT: What do you think is similar about the Ukraine situation and the Taiwan situation? [OPEN TEXT]

PROPOSED ANALYSIS

For our analyses, we take three approaches to ensure our results are robust to different modeling choices:

1. Compare sample means for the relevant outcome variable within the “weak frame” group and the “strong frame” group.
2. In OLS models, regress outcome variables on indicators for the “weak frame” group (omitting the “strong frame” group as the reference category) with demographic controls.
3. In logit models, regress dichotomized outcome variables (i.e., Likely/Unlikely, Unreliable/Reliable) on an indicator for the “weak frame” group with demographic controls.

We intend to present #1 and/or #2 in the main text, with the other models in the appendix. The specific demographic controls we will use in the regression models are:

- FEMALE: Coded 1 if respondent identifies their sex as “Female” and 0 otherwise.
- AGE: Binned into three categories, Ages 18-34, 35-54, and 55+
- URBAN: Coded 1 if the respondent identifies that they live in an urban area and 0 otherwise.
- COLLEGE_HIGHER: Coded 1 if respondent answers that their highest level of education is College, Masters, or Doctoral program and 0 otherwise.

- HAN: Coded 1 if the respondent identifies their ethnicity as Han and 0 otherwise.
- EAST CHINA: Coded 1 if the respondent lives in East China region(closest to Taiwan) and 0 otherwise.

Our first priority is to assess the ToR Hypothesis. Specifically, we want to know whether framing the U.S. as having a “weak” as opposed to a “strong” response to the Russia-Ukraine crisis makes the Chinese public approve of more assertive policies towards Taiwan. We will assess this in three ways described above (comparison of sample means, OLS models, and logit models) using the outcome variable CHINA_TAIWAN. We consider this model to be supported if the average response to CHINA_TAIWAN is higher in the WEAK_FRAME group relative to the STRONG_FRAME group, and this difference is statistically significant.

We then evaluate the three assumptions of the ToR model.

First, to evaluate Assumption 1, we consider whether or not framing the U.S. response as “weak” affects America’s reputation for being a reliable partner and their reputation for resolve. We use the three proposed analysis (comparison of sample means, OLS models, and logit models) with outcome variables US_RELIABLE and US_RESOLVE. We consider this assumption to be violated if the average response to US_RELIABLE and/or US_RESOLVE is not significantly different in the WEAK_FRAME group relative to the STRONG_FRAME group.

Second, to evaluate Assumption 2, we first consider whether or not framing the U.S. response as “weak” reduces perceptions of U.S. willingness to defend Taiwan due to perceived similarities between the Ukraine crisis and a future Taiwan crisis. We again use the three proposed analysis methods (comparison of sample means, OLS models, and logit models) with outcome variables US_TAIWAN_PUNISH and US_TAIWAN_DEFEND. We then calculate the proportion of respondents who view the Ukraine and Taiwan situations as similar or different (UKR_TAIWAN), pooling across both frames. We consider this assumption violated if: (1) the average response to US_TAIWAN_PUNISH and/or US_TAIWAN_DEFEND is not significantly different in the WEAK_FRAME group relative to the STRONG_FRAME group, and (2) a plurality of respondents select “Different” in their response to UKR_TAIWAN.

Third, to evaluate Assumption 3, we will consider whether decreases in the perception that the U.S. will defend Taiwan leads to support for a more assertive Chinese policy towards Taiwan. We consider this assumption to be violated if: (1) the average response to US_TAIWAN_PUNISH or US_TAIWAN_DEFEND is lower in the WEAK_FRAME group relative to the STRONG_FRAME group, and this difference is statistically significant, but (2) the average response to CHINA_TAIWAN is not significantly different in the WEAK_FRAME group relative to the STRONG_FRAME group.

B. Differences between PAP and final paper

As a result of the peer review process, the labeling of our theoretical framework differs in our final paper relative to the PAP. Importantly, there are two main differences between our PAP and how the theoretical discussion is presented in the final paper.

First, we renamed the overarching framework of interest in this study. In the PAP, the central framework was termed “Transferability of Reputation” (ToR). In the final paper, we rename this framework “Cross-Crisis Reputational Deterrence” (CCRD) in response to reviewer feedback that

the question of whether reputation for resolve transfers is analytically distinct from whether it affects the behavior of the challenger. We see the term CCRD as more appropriate for the main objective of the paper, which is to investigate the potential deterrent effects of reputation for resolve across international crises.

Second, we add an additional assumption and application to Assumption 2. In the PAP, Assumption 2 focuses on assessments of situational comparability, or whether observers view the context in which a past crisis unfolded as highly comparable to future potential crisis. In the final paper, we preserve this assumption as Assumption 2B but add an additional direct assessment of whether reputation transfers as a new Assumption 2A. These revisions were based on reviewer feedback that situational comparability is only an indirect test of transferability. The tests of Assumption 2 remain the same as they were presented in the PAP. The revised assumptions and applications in the final paper read:

- **A2A (Assumption):** *The defender's response to a past crisis changes a new challenger's beliefs about how the defender would respond to an unrelated future crisis.*
- **A2A (Application):** *A weaker (stronger) U.S. response to Russian aggression in Ukraine should make the Chinese public believe that the U.S. would have a weaker (stronger) response to a hypothetical future crisis between China and Taiwan.*
- **A2B (Assumption):** *A new challenger sees the first crisis scenario as relatively comparable to the second crisis scenario.*
- **A2B (Application):** *The Chinese public sees Russia's invasion of Ukraine as relatively comparable to a hypothetical future crisis scenario involving China and Taiwan.*

VI. Sample Quality, Attentiveness, and Manipulation Check

Because the results for our primary hypothesis, the Cross-Crisis Reputational Deterrence (CCRD) Hypothesis, are null, we need to ensure they are not due to issues with sample quality, inattentiveness, or the experimental manipulation. To make sure our treatment conditions worked as intended, we included a manipulation check. After reading the vignette, respondents were asked: *In your opinion, has the U.S. response to Russia been strong or weak?* The answer options were: *Very strong / Somewhat strong / Somewhat weak / Very weak / I don't know*. Table A1 shows the summary statistics of responses to the manipulation check question. The results indicate that respondents receiving the “Weak Frame” are much less likely to view the U.S. response as strong (47.2%) relative to those receiving the “Strong Frame” (75.6%). This difference is substantively large and statistically significant at conventional levels as shown in Table A2, which presents results from a logistic regression model where the dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent views the U.S. response to Russia as “Somewhat Strong” or “Very Strong” and 0 otherwise. The strength of the manipulation check makes us confident that our null findings for the overarching CCRD hypothesis are not due to the ineffectiveness of the frames.

Table A1: Summary Statistics of Manipulation Check

	Strong Frame			Weak Frame		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Manipulation Check Outcome (numeric)	495	3	0.78	495	2.5	0.83
Manipulation Check Outcome (categorical)	508			510		
... Very weak	22	4%		59	12%	
... Somewhat weak	89	18%		195	38%	
... Somewhat strong	258	51%		193	38%	
... Very strong	126	25%		48	9%	
... I don't know	12	2%		13	3%	
...	1	0%		2	0%	

Note: when converting the categorical manipulation check outcomes into numeric values:

Very weak=1, Somewhat weak=2, Somewhat strong=3, Very strong=4, I don't know=NA

We do three other things in the survey to ensure a high quality sample. First, we kept the survey questions short and simple (median response time: less than 7 minutes) and tried to make the content stimulating for survey respondents. Next, we screened out potential bots and inattentive respondents before delivering the treatment. To screen out bots, we asked respondents to complete a reCAPTCHA question before entering the survey. To screen out inattentive respondents, we embedded a simple attention check within the first few minutes of the survey. This attention check question is: *Many people like sports. We are checking to make sure you're reading carefully. Instead of clicking on your favorite sport, please select the third answer out of the four choices below.* The answer options are: *Basketball / Table Tennis / Football (Soccer) / Badminton*. We screen out respondents who do not answer correctly before the experiment starts. Their responses were not included in our target quotas or in our final analyses.²⁰ We screen out these respondents

²⁰6% of the initial sample did not pass the attention check, and therefore did not move forward in the survey. We note that this figure is significantly better than comparable online samples of U.S. adults (e.g., Aronow et al. 2020).

Table A2: Has the U.S. response to Russia been strong or weak?

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Very strong/Somewhat strong
Weak Frame	-1.294*** (0.140)
Constant	1.241*** (0.108)
Observations	990
Log Likelihood	-606.389
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,216.777

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; ****p<0.001

before the treatment because including only responses from survey participants who pass attention checks and/or manipulation checks after the treatment can be a form of post-treatment bias (Montgomery, Nyhan and Torres 2018).

Third, we checked for other inconsistencies in responses using a different set of demographic questions that were not related to the treatment. The survey asks respondents two questions about travel to the U.S. The first question says: “Have you traveled to the United States?” On the next screen, we ask: “How much time in total have you been in the United States?” We check the proportion of respondents who answer this question consistently (i.e., who respond “No” to the first question and “None” to the second question, or who respond “Yes” to the first question and do not respond “None” to the second question). We find that 1008/1018 respondents answer this question consistently, or 99.2% of our sample, providing more evidence of attentiveness. Taking these factors into consideration, we think it is extremely unlikely that the null result for the CCRD hypothesis is attributable to poor sample quality or inattentiveness.

VII. Regression Tables for Primary Results

In our pre-analysis plan, we proposed to take three approaches to evaluating our hypotheses. We first compared mean responses for the outcome variables in the “Weak Frame” vs. “Strong Frame” groups. Second, in OLS regression models, we regressed outcome variables on indicators for the “Weak Frame” group (omitting the “Strong Frame” group as the reference category) with demographic controls. Third, in logistic regression models, we regressed binary outcome variables (i.e., Likely/Unlikely, Unreliable/Reliable) on an indicator for the “Weak Frame” group with demographic controls. This section presents the regression tables for the CCRD assumptions. The pre-registered covariates included in the regression models are:

- FEMALE: Coded 1 if respondent identifies their sex as “Female” and 0 otherwise.
- AGE: Binned into three categories, Ages 18-34, 35-54, and 55+
- URBAN: Coded 1 if the respondent identifies that they live in an urban area and 0 otherwise.
- COLLEGE_HIGHER: Coded 1 if respondent answers that their highest level of education is College, Masters, or Doctoral program and 0 otherwise.
- HAN: Coded 1 if the respondent identifies their ethnicity as Han and 0 otherwise.
- EAST CHINA: Coded 1 if the respondent lives in East China region (closest to Taiwan) and 0 otherwise.

Table A3: Test of CCRD Hypothesis

	DV: Assertiveness Towards Taiwan			
	5 pt DV (OLS)		Binary DV (Logit)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Weak Frame	0.064 (0.070)	0.090 (0.069)	0.126 (0.140)	0.190 (0.147)
Female		-0.278*** (0.071)		-0.527*** (0.155)
Age (35-54)		-0.030 (0.087)		-0.137 (0.199)
Age (55+)		-0.372*** (0.095)		-0.784*** (0.204)
Han		0.242 (0.197)		1.147** (0.379)
Urban		-0.226 (0.227)		-0.159 (0.481)
College		0.393*** (0.096)		0.594** (0.191)
East China		-0.074 (0.077)		-0.189 (0.163)
Constant	0.822*** (0.050)	0.800** (0.290)	0.881*** (0.098)	0.156 (0.587)
Observations	1,013	1,002	1,013	1,002
Log Likelihood			-600.598	-562.056
Akaike Inf. Crit.			1,205.196	1,142.112

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A3 shows the results for the CCRD Hypothesis. The dependent variable is: *In your opinion, in its policy towards Taiwan, China should be: Much less assertive (-2) / Somewhat less assertive (-1) / About the same (0) / Somewhat more assertive (1) / Much more assertive (2)*. Models 1 and 2 are OLS regression models where the dependent variable captures the 5-pt Likert scale (-2

to 2). In Models 3 and 4, the dependent variable is a binary variable (1= *Somewhat more assertive* / *Much more assertive*). In all models, the coefficient on “Weak Frame” is substantively small and not significant at conventional levels, giving us no support for the CCRD Hypothesis.

Table A4: Test of Assumption 1 (Reputation Formation)

	DV: General Perception of U.S. Resolve				DV: General Perception of U.S. Reliability			
	4 pt DV (OLS)		Binary DV (Logit)		4 pt DV (OLS)		Binary DV (Logit)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Weak Frame	-0.220*** (0.060)	-0.220*** (0.060)	-0.390** (0.129)	-0.402** (0.131)	-0.068 (0.058)	-0.088 (0.058)	-0.030 (0.150)	-0.068 (0.155)
Female		0.118* (0.063)		0.205 (0.136)		0.325*** (0.060)		0.816*** (0.167)
Age (35-54)		-0.042 (0.076)		-0.155 (0.167)		0.062 (0.074)		0.265 (0.207)
Age (55+)		-0.034 (0.083)		-0.211 (0.181)		0.230** (0.080)		0.607** (0.219)
Han		0.170 (0.180)		0.228 (0.388)		-0.115 (0.168)		-0.422 (0.421)
Urban		-0.456* (0.210)		-0.367 (0.467)		0.231 (0.195)		0.059 (0.530)
College		0.042 (0.085)		0.006 (0.185)		-0.203* (0.082)		-0.568** (0.206)
East China		-0.094 (0.068)		-0.313* (0.146)		0.037 (0.065)		-0.002 (0.175)
Constant	2.757*** (0.042)	2.997*** (0.266)	0.394*** (0.092)	0.645 (0.583)	2.004*** (0.041)	1.781*** (0.248)	-1.181*** (0.106)	-1.151+ (0.654)
Observations	988	978	988	978	999	989	999	989
Log Likelihood			-675.541	-663.435			-541.397	-514.369
Akaike Inf. Crit.			1,355.083	1,344.871			1,086.794	1,046.738

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A4 tests Assumption 1 (*reputation formation*). The testable implication of this assumption is that respondents receiving the “Weak Frame” (“Strong Frame”) should perceive the U.S. as having less (more) resolve in international crises *in general*. Models 1 through 4 test this assumption using direct measures of perceptions of the U.S. resolve. We asked respondents: *In your opinion, how likely or unlikely is the United States to stand firm in an international crisis? Very unlikely (1) / Somewhat unlikely (2) / Somewhat likely (3) / Very likely (4) / I don’t know (NA)*. Models 1 and 2 are OLS regression models with the 4-pt dependent variable, and Models 3 and 4 are logistic regression models with a binary dependent variable (1 = “Somewhat likely” or “Very likely.”). The negative, statistically significant coefficient on “Weak Frame” supports Assumption 1. In other words, framing the U.S. response to Russian aggression as relatively weak decreases general perceptions of U.S. willingness to stand firm in crises. Substantively, the results of Model 4 suggest that compared to the “Strong Frame” group, respondents in the “Weak Frame” group are 10% less likely to believe that the U.S. will be either somewhat or very likely to stand firm in an international crisis.

Models 5-8 of Table A4 also tests Assumption 1 using perceptions of U.S. reliability rather than U.S. resolve. We asked respondents: *In your opinion, how reliable or unreliable do you think the United States is as a partner in international politics? Very unreliable (1) / Somewhat unreliable (2) / Somewhat reliable (3) / Very reliable (4) / I don’t know (NA)*. Again, Models 5 and 6 are OLS regression models with the 4-pt dependent variable, and Models 7 and 8 are logistic regression models with a binary dependent variable (1 = “Somewhat reliable” or “Very reliable.”). Here, the

coefficient on “Weak Frame” is negative but not statistically significant at conventional levels. Because we did not specify in the survey which partnership the respondents should evaluate (and we had not yet asked respondents about Taiwan), we acknowledge this question could be interpreted in multiple ways. We think it’s possible that many respondents answering this question are thinking about whether or not the U.S. is a reliable partner for China. Therefore, we rely on the results from Models 1-4 as a more direct test of Assumption 1.

Table A5: Test of Assumption 2 (Transfer of Reputation)

	<i>DV: Belief that the U.S. Would Defend Taiwan</i>				<i>DV: Belief that the U.S. Would Punish China</i>			
	4 pt DV (OLS)		Binary DV (Logit)		4 pt DV (OLS)		Binary DV (Logit)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Weak Frame	-0.132*	-0.146*	-0.291*	-0.326*	-0.088	-0.073	-0.180	-0.146
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.128)	(0.133)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.131)	(0.133)
Female		0.402***		0.710***		0.165**		0.309*
		(0.068)		(0.140)		(0.063)		(0.138)
Age (35-54)		0.122		0.104		0.171*		0.260
		(0.084)		(0.169)		(0.077)		(0.170)
Age (55+)		0.276**		0.349+		0.074		-0.029
		(0.090)		(0.183)		(0.084)		(0.181)
Han		0.237		0.206		-0.148		-0.272
		(0.190)		(0.389)		(0.176)		(0.397)
Urban		0.256		0.607		-0.174		-0.370
		(0.233)		(0.489)		(0.204)		(0.467)
College		-0.211*		-0.662***		-0.052		-0.142
		(0.092)		(0.189)		(0.085)		(0.186)
East China		-0.053		-0.171		-0.057		-0.181
		(0.074)		(0.150)		(0.069)		(0.148)
Constant	2.601***	1.962***	0.143	-0.591	2.840***	3.035***	0.568***	1.111*
	(0.047)	(0.293)	(0.091)	(0.612)	(0.043)	(0.260)	(0.094)	(0.592)
Observations	977	967	977	967	995	985	995	985
Log Likelihood			-674.622	-643.718			-661.200	-649.445
Akaike Inf. Crit.			1,353.244	1,305.436			1,326.399	1,316.890

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A5 tests Assumption 2 (*transfer of reputation*). Assumption A2A suggests that framing the U.S. response to Russian aggression as strong and weak should impact respondents’ belief that the U.S. would defend Taiwan (Models 1-4) and punish China (Models 5-8). To measure beliefs about the U.S. defending Taiwan, we asked respondents: *In your opinion, how likely or unlikely do you think that the U.S. would defend Taiwan if China decides to unify Taiwan with military force? Very unlikely (1) / Somewhat unlikely (2) / Somewhat unlikely (3) / Very unlikely (4) / I don’t know (NA)*. Models 1 and 2 are OLS regression models with the 4-pt dependent variable, and Models 3 and 4 are logistic regression models with a binary dependent variable (1 = “Somewhat likely” or “Very likely.”). The coefficient on “Weak Frame” is negative and statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level, giving us some support for Assumption 2. Substantively, results from Model 4 in Table A5 suggest that compared to the “Strong Frame” group, respondents in the “Weak Frame” group are about 8% less likely to believe that the U.S. will be either somewhat or very likely to defend Taiwan if China decides to unify Taiwan with military force.

To measure beliefs about the U.S. punishing China, we asked respondents: *In your opinion, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the U.S. would impose harsh punishments against China if China decides to unify Taiwan with military force? Very unlikely (1) / Somewhat unlikely (2) / Somewhat unlikely (3) / Very unlikely (4) / I don’t know (NA)*. Models 5 and 6 are OLS regression

models with the 4-pt dependent variable, and Models 7 and 8 are logistic regression models with a binary dependent variable (1 = “Somewhat likely” or “Very likely.”). While the coefficients on “Weak Frame” are negative, they are not statistically significant at conventional levels. Overall, we see some support for Assumption A2A, but it is mixed.

VIII. Exploration of Assumption 2

Our paper also discusses how Assumption 2 (*transfer of reputation*) is more likely to be violated if the two crises are not perceived as similar. Specifically, we note that Assumption 2 may be violated if the challenger perceives important differences between the challenger-protégé, defender-challenger, or defender-protégé relationships across the two crisis scenarios. This section elaborates on some key differences across each of these dimensions in the U.S.-Russia-Ukraine relationship and the U.S.-China-Taiwan relationship, and how that might affect the transferability of reputation. We focus on the main differences perceived by our survey respondents in China but note that other researchers highlight many additional differences between these relationships and crisis scenarios (see, for example, analyses from Feigenbaum and Szubin 2023; Glaser 2022; Greitens 2022; Norris 2023; Sacks 2022; Wong 2023).

Challenger-Protégé: Following Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, Beijing has continued to emphasize the differences in the challenger-protégé relationships (Russia-Ukraine vs. China-Taiwan) by stressing that Ukraine is sovereign state whereas Taiwan is not (PRC Foreign Ministry 2022). Chinese official statements assert that “[t]he Taiwan question and the Ukraine issue are fundamentally different in nature” and that “the Taiwan question is purely China’s internal affair that brooks no foreign interference” (PRC Foreign Ministry 2022). The respondents in our survey seemed to broadly reflect this perspective (see manuscript). This perceived difference on sovereignty issue can affect the transferability of reputation in a few important ways. First, seeing Taiwan as an internal affair shielded by sovereignty might lead the Chinese public to question whether the U.S. would have a justifiable reason to intervene. For example, one response reads, “Ukraine’s situation is fundamentally different Taiwan as Taiwan has always belonged to China, and the U.S. has no right to intervene in Taiwan affairs.”²¹ Second, the insistence on sovereignty could be a manifestation of a nonnegotiable stance on the issue, indicating that the Chinese public’s preference is not influenced by the anticipated U.S. response. For example, one response reads, “Because Taiwan belongs to China, we should not back down on this issue.”²²

Defender-Protégé: Another key difference between these crisis scenarios is the nature of the defender-protégé relationships (U.S.-Ukraine vs. U.S.-Taiwan). In particular, many analysts point to the strategic value of Taiwan and its important position in the global high-tech supply chain (Blanchard 2022). Importantly, these perceived differences could distort the transfer of reputation in different directions. If the Chinese public also perceives the stakes to be much higher for the U.S. in Taiwan relative to Ukraine, a “weak” U.S. response to the Russia-Ukraine crisis might not impact the Chinese public’s assessment of how the U.S. would respond to a future crisis with Taiwan. However, in our sample, there are only a handful of completed responses (5 out of 404) that attribute the difference between two scenarios to factors that related to the Defender-Protégé relationship. Only one response explicitly mentions that “Taiwan’s position in the global supply chain is higher.”²³

Defender-Challenger: It is also possible that the Chinese public perceives the U.S.-China relationship as substantively different from the U.S.-Russia relationship in ways that prevent Washington from imposing similar punishments on China relative to Russia. At the height of the U.S.-China trade war, several prominent Chinese economists asserted that the size of China’s

²¹Response ID: R_2Cpvrepl72k9MhL

²²Response ID: R_2QYg0hcTDWGdyM0

²³Response ID: R_3p3xzXHpARvz3qL

economy and the degree of economic interdependence between the U.S. and China made China “too big to be removed” from SWIFT system (Lian 2020). Similar arguments were made after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and subsequent removal from SWIFT. If the Chinese public holds similar views, they may doubt U.S. willingness and ability to impose comparable sanctions against China in the event it decided to unify Taiwan with military force. Interestingly, none of the responses in our sample mentioned economic interdependence in explaining why they perceive the two crises as different. Instead, among those who do attribute the difference to the Defender-Challenger relationship (10 out of 404) emphasize that “the U.S. treats China as the top competitor and thus will leverage Taiwan to weaken China”²⁴, while Ukraine is more of a “consequence of NATO expansion.”²⁵

Exploration of Survey Results

In our pre-analysis plan, we proposed two approaches to test Assumption 2 (*transfer of reputation*). First, we look for evidence that the U.S. response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine affected perception of how the U.S. might respond to a hypothetical China-Taiwan crisis as a test of Assumption 2A. As the results in the manuscript and Appendix Table A5 indicate, this approach gives us some support for a transfer of reputation, but the evidence is mixed.

Our second approach relies on directly asking respondents whether and why they perceive the Ukraine crisis as similar to or different from a crisis involving Taiwan as a test of Assumption 2B. As discussed in the paper, in both “Strong” and “Weak” groups, the majority of respondents view two crisis scenarios as different from each other (about 54%) while only about 30% view them as similar. To understand respondents’ reasoning, we hand code open-ended responses in two ways. First, we classify responses based on ten substantive topic areas listed in Table A6.²⁶ We are able to classify 404 out of 551 respondents who view the two crises as “different” and 204 out of 312 respondents who view the two crises as “similar” into these topic areas.²⁷

As we reported in the main paper, a disproportionate majority (73%) of completed responses that view these situations as “different” emphasize different perceptions of sovereignty between Ukraine and Taiwan. In contrast, the most cited reason for viewing two crises as “similar” is the involvement of the United States either as the defender of the Ukraine/Taiwan or as the root cause of the crises (42%). Interestingly, the second-most cited reason for viewing two crises as similar is also “Sovereignty/Territorial integrity” (32%).²⁸

To further explore the impact of perceived situational compatibility on the transfer of reputation, we conduct exploratory analyses of the subset of respondents who view the Ukraine and Taiwan situations as “different” versus “similar.” Table A7 shows that respondents who view the two crises as “similar” also update their beliefs about how the U.S. would respond to a future Taiwan crisis. In contrast, for those who view the two crises as “different”, framing the U.S. response to Russian aggression toward Ukraine as “weak” significantly affects their assessment of U.S. resolve in general (Model 7 and 8), but has no significant impact on their assessment of how

²⁴Response ID: R_cVjKl5HCeTVKBdT

²⁵Response ID: R_2QgMIFDMEtquX5m

²⁶To do this, one researcher generated a list of topics based on reading all of the open-ended responses. Then, a second researcher independently classified each response into the topic areas.

²⁷There are in 255 respondents who either left the open-ended question blank or did not provide any specific or relevant responses.

²⁸A typical response reads, “Both [Russia and China] are trying to unify the territory that used to belong to them.

Table A6: Coding of Open-ended Responses

Topics	Coding
<i>Balance of power</i>	coded 1 if there is any mention of balance of power between Ukraine and Russia and/or between Taiwan and China, and 0 otherwise
<i>Domestic politics of challenger</i>	coded 1 if there is any mention of domestic politics (e.g., leaders, regime type, decision-making process) of Russia and/or China, and 0 otherwise
<i>Ethnic identity</i>	coded 1 if there is any mention of ethnic identity or ethnic ties between Ukrainians and Russians and/or between Taiwanese and Chinese, and 0 otherwise
<i>Geopolitical factors</i>	coded 1 if there is any mention of geopolitical factors or strategic value related to Ukraine and/or Taiwan, and 0 otherwise
<i>Great power competition</i>	coded 1 if there is any mention of great power relations between the U.S. and Russia and/or between the U.S. and China, and 0 otherwise
<i>History</i>	coded 1 if there is any mention of the historical origin of the Ukraine/Taiwan crisis, and 0 otherwise
<i>International community</i>	coded 1 if there is any mention of the broader international community, and 0 otherwise
<i>Sovereignty/Territorial integrity</i>	coded 1 if there is any mention of sovereignty, internal affairs, and/or territorial integrity, and 0 otherwise
<i>U.S. involvement</i>	coded 1 if there is any mention of the involvement of the United States in the crisis, and 0 otherwise
<i>Others</i>	coded 1 if the response mentions any specific reasons/factors not captured above

Note: these topics are not mutually exclusive.

the U.S. might respond to a future Taiwan crisis (Models 9-12).²⁹

Table A7: Test of Assumption 2 for Respondents in ‘Similarity’ and ‘Different’ Group

	Similarity Group						Difference Group					
	US Resolve		US Defend Taiwan		US Punish China		US Resolve		US Defend Taiwan		US Punish China	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Weak Frame	-0.364** (0.119)	-0.351** (0.123)	-0.252* (0.125)	-0.259* (0.127)	-0.263* (0.115)	-0.262* (0.118)	-0.167* (0.075)	-0.168* (0.076)	-0.120 (0.085)	-0.093 (0.084)	-0.050 (0.080)	-0.004 (0.080)
Constant	2.831*** (0.087)	3.430*** (0.932)	2.797*** (0.091)	4.083*** (0.938)	2.986*** (0.084)	3.888*** (0.874)	2.721*** (0.053)	2.899*** (0.285)	2.439*** (0.060)	1.880*** (0.306)	2.747*** (0.057)	3.162*** (0.290)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	309	308	308	307	309	308	541	532	533	524	544	535
Adjusted R ²	0.027	0.021	0.010	0.034	0.013	0.025	0.007	0.012	0.002	0.063	-0.001	0.032

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. All models are OLS regressions using the 4-pt Likert scale DV.

²⁹Since we did not pre-register this analysis, and perceptions of similarity or difference across crisis are measured post-treatment, we consider this only an exploratory analysis.

X. Exploration of Assumption 3

To test Assumption 3 (*deterrence by reputation*), we consider whether respondents updated their assessments of China’s policy towards Taiwan in response to perceptions that the U.S. would be more resolved to defend Taiwan in the future. In our pre-analysis plan, we wrote that we would consider Assumption 3 to be violated if two criteria were met. First, relative to respondents who receive the “Weak Frame,” those who receive the “Strong Frame” must view the U.S. as more likely to defend Taiwan and to punish China in the event that China decides to unify Taiwan with military force. Second, respondents in the “Weak Frame” condition should not have significantly different opinion about China’s policy towards Taiwan in the future relative to those in the “Strong Frame” condition. This would suggest to us that the Chinese public did update their beliefs about the likelihood of U.S. action, but their attitudes towards Taiwan remain relatively fixed. Based on this criteria, we concluded that we do not have support for Assumption 3. This section conducts additional exploratory analyses to corroborate this conclusion.

First, we look for evidence of a CCRD effect among respondents who reported that they viewed the Ukraine crisis and the Taiwan crisis as “similar.” These should be the respondents for which U.S. reputation is most likely to transfer across crises *and* deter future challengers. Table A8 shows regression results on the three key dependent variables—both in their original Likert scale and as binary measures—for respondents in the “similar” group. Among the respondents in this subgroup, framing the U.S. response to Russian aggression to “weak” (relative to “strong”) has a negative and statistically significant impact on perceptions of U.S. reputation for resolve in general (Model 1-2 and 7-8) and perceptions that the U.S. would defend Taiwan in a future hypothetical crisis (Model 3-4 and 9-10), but it does *not* have a statistically significant impact on assertiveness towards Taiwan (Model 5-6 and 11-12).³⁰ While this analysis suggests A3 is unsupported, it has limitations. Perceptions of similarity or difference across crisis are measured post-treatment, and there are other unobserved factors that may affect these attitudes. In addition, given the small sample size (311 respondents), the analysis in Model 3 could be underpowered.

Table A8: Test of Assumption 3 for Respondents in ‘Similar’ Group

	Likert Scale DV (OLS)						Binary DV (Logit)					
	US Resolve		US Defend Taiwan		Assertiveness toward Taiwan		US Resolve		US Defend Taiwan		Assertiveness toward Taiwan	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Weak Frame	−0.364** (0.119)	−0.351** (0.123)	−0.252* (0.125)	−0.259* (0.127)	0.176 (0.130)	0.246+ (0.133)	−0.542* (0.232)	−0.512* (0.241)	−0.555* (0.232)	−0.623* (0.246)	0.165 (0.261)	0.295 (0.277)
Constant	2.831*** (0.087)	3.430*** (0.932)	2.797*** (0.091)	4.083*** (0.938)	0.806*** (0.095)	−0.050 (0.986)	0.459** (0.172)	14.347 (619.036)	0.470** (0.172)	15.065 (624.123)	0.990*** (0.188)	−2.539 (1.939)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	309	308	308	307	311	310	309	308	308	307	311	310
Adjusted R ²	0.027	0.021	0.010	0.034	0.003	0.016						
Log Likelihood							−210.399	−204.763	−209.499	−199.892	−176.046	−167.777
Akaike Inf. Crit.							424.798	427.527	422.997	417.784	356.093	353.554

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

³⁰While the effects of “Weak Frame” on assertiveness towards Taiwan are positive through out all these models, which is in expected direction, none of these is statistically significant at conventional levels.

Second, we use an instrumental variable strategy (2SLS regression), regressing attitudes about how assertive China should be towards Taiwan (measured on a 5pt Likert scale from “Much less assertive” to “Much more assertive”) on perceptions of the likelihood that the U.S. will defend Taiwan in the event that China decided to unify Taiwan with military force (measured on a 4pt Likert scale from “Very unlikely” to “Very likely”), with the treatment (an indicator for “Weak Frame”) as the instrument. Table A9 reports the second stage, which shows that the coefficient on “US Defend Taiwan” is not statistically significant at conventional levels. We are similarly cautious in over-interpreting these results for two reasons. First, it is possible that the experimental frame is a weak instrument. A diagnostic test for weak instruments from the `ivreg` package in R suggests that we can reject the null hypothesis that the instrument is weak ($p=0.0491$ and $p=0.028$ for Model 1 and Model 2, respectively), but depending on what diagnostic criteria are used, the results vary. Second, we do not directly randomize perceptions of the likelihood that the U.S. will defend Taiwan.

Table A9: IV Regression (Second Stage): Test of Assumption 3

	DV: Assertiveness Towards Taiwan	
	(1)	(2)
US Defend Taiwan	−0.422 (0.546)	−0.575 (0.511)
Constant	1.929 (1.385)	1.884* (1.040)
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	976	966
<i>Note:</i> * $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$		

Coupled with qualitative evidence from open-ended responses, we collectively take these findings to suggest that Assumption 3 is not supported in our application. However, we leave additional definitive tests of this assumption to future research.

XI. Exploration of Heterogeneous Effects

As emphasized in the paper, our main analyses focus on tests of the CCRD hypothesis and its underlying assumptions. Since we do not pre-register additional heterogeneous effects, we consider the analyses in this section of the appendix to be exploratory. We also caution against over-interpreting these heterogeneous effects given that our sample size is relatively small (1,015 respondents). We look at heterogeneous effects of the treatment by the following variables, all measured pre-treatment:

- *Any Experience in the U.S.*: Measured as a binary variable with 1 indicating that the respondent reports any travel to the U.S. (Table A10)
- *Significant Experience in the U.S.*: Measured as a binary variable with 1 indicating that the respondent reports spending one or more years in the U.S. (Table A10)
- *High Interest in International Affairs*: Measured as a binary variable with 1 indicating that the respondent reports spending 30 minutes or more each day reading about foreign affairs (Table A11)
- *Access to International Internet*: Measured as a binary variable with 1 indicating that the respondent reports getting their news from the “International Internet” (Table A11)
- *Internet Primary News Source*: Measured as a binary variable with 1 indicating that the respondent reports receiving most of their news from either “Domestic Internet” or “International Internet” (Table A11)
- *Communist Party Membership*: Measured as a binary variable with 1 indicating that the respondent reports belonging to the Communist Party (Table A12 and Table A13)
- *Political Ideology*: Measured as a 5-pt Likert scale ranging from 1 (Very Liberal) to 5 (Very Conservative) (Table A12)
- *Hawkishness*: Measured as a binary variable with 1 indicating that the respondents believes that China uses military force “too little” in foreign affairs. (Table A12)
- *Higher Education*: Measured as a binary variable with 1 indicating that the respondent reports holding a college or higher degree. (Table A13)
- *Income*: Measure as a 9-pt Likert scale ranging from 1 (household income is less than 10,000 CNY) to 9 (household income is more than 1,000,000 CNY).

For all models in Table A10- A13, the dependent variable is coded from a 5 pt Likert scale based on the following question: *In your opinion, in its policy towards Taiwan, China should be: Much less assertive (-2) / Somewhat less assertive (-1) / About the same (0) / Somewhat more assertive (1) / Much more assertive (2)*. As seen in Table A10- A13, we don’t observe strong evidence for heterogeneous effects of the frames across different relevant subsets of our sample. One possible exception is in Table A11, where we see some effects of the frames among respondents who have high interest in international news or access to the international internet. However, many of these results are inconsistent across models and only statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level.

Table A10: CCRD Hypothesis: Heterogeneity by Previous Experience in the U.S.

	<i>DV: Assertiveness Towards Taiwan (5 pt scale)</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Weak Frame (WF)	0.119 (0.099)	0.154 (0.096)	0.065 (0.072)	0.094 (0.070)
Any US Travel*WF	-0.105 (0.140)	-0.114 (0.136)		
Significant US Travel*WF			0.027 (0.339)	-0.027 (0.332)
Any US Travel	-0.004 (0.099)	-0.219* (0.100)		
Significant US Travel			-0.231 (0.254)	-0.337 (0.247)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1,013	1,002	1,013	1,002
Adjusted R ²	-0.001	0.073	-0.0005	0.064

Note: ⁺p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A11: CCRD Hypothesis: Heterogeneity by News Sources & Interests

	<i>DV: Assertiveness Towards Taiwan (5 pt scale)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Weak Frame (WF)	0.278 ⁺ (0.142)	0.270 ⁺ (0.139)	0.263* (0.109)	0.313** (0.107)	0.139 (0.092)	0.150 ⁺ (0.090)
High Int. News Interest*WF	-0.280 ⁺ (0.163)	-0.240 (0.159)				
Access to Int. Internet*WF			-0.335* (0.142)	-0.371** (0.139)		
Internet Primary News Source*WF					-0.173 (0.142)	-0.135 (0.138)
High Int. News Interest	0.302** (0.114)	0.209 ⁺ (0.113)				
Access to International Internet			0.200* (0.100)	0.120 (0.098)		
Internet Primary News Source					0.139 (0.100)	-0.012 (0.100)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1,012	1,002	1,012	1,001	1,012	1,001
Adjusted R ²	0.005	0.063	0.004	0.067	-0.0001	0.062

Note: ⁺p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A12: CCRD Hypothesis: Heterogeneity by Political Views

	<i>DV: Assertiveness Towards Taiwan (5 pt scale)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Weak Frame (WF)	0.046 (0.087)	0.061 (0.085)	0.121 (0.203)	0.127 (0.199)	0.060 (0.088)	0.085 (0.086)
Communist Party*WF	0.041 (0.151)	0.060 (0.148)				
Political Ideology*WF			−0.023 (0.078)	−0.015 (0.076)		
Hawkish*WF					0.014 (0.149)	−0.013 (0.146)
Communist Party	0.083 (0.106)	−0.014 (0.105)				
Political Ideology			−0.097 ⁺ (0.055)	−0.085 (0.055)		
Hawkish					0.021 (0.107)	0.038 (0.105)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	980	970	990	979	982	972
Adjusted R ²	−0.0004	0.067	0.006	0.067	−0.002	0.063

Note: ⁺p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A13: CCRD Hypothesis: Heterogeneity by Elite Proxies

	<i>DV: Assertiveness Towards Taiwan (5 pt scale)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Weak Frame (WF)	0.044 (0.148)	0.099 (0.147)	0.203 (0.294)	0.230 (0.286)	0.046 (0.087)	0.061 (0.085)
Higher Education*WF	0.010 (0.167)	−0.011 (0.166)				
Income*WF			−0.023 (0.046)	−0.024 (0.045)		
Communist Party*WF					0.041 (0.151)	0.060 (0.148)
Higher Education	0.524*** (0.116)	0.399** (0.125)		0.425*** (0.100)		0.435*** (0.101)
Income			0.026 (0.031)	−0.011 (0.032)		
Communist Party					0.083 (0.106)	−0.014 (0.105)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1,013	1,002	1,011	1,000	980	970
Adjusted R ²	0.036	0.061	−0.002	0.061	−0.0004	0.067

Note: ⁺p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

XII. Translation of “Assertiveness”

There are debates around the appropriate translation of the phrase “assertive foreign policy” [强硬的外交政策]. To understand how survey respondents interpret this phrase, we ask the following question at the end of the survey:

assertive_def: *We used the word “assertive” a lot in this survey and we want to know how respondents interpret this word. What do you think best describes a more assertive Chinese foreign policy?* [在本次问卷中我们多次提及“强硬”一词。我们想了解您是如何理解该词的。在下列选项中，您认为最能准确描述更加强硬的中国外交政策的一项是？]

- *Defend China’s interests more resolutely* [在维护中国利益方面更加坚定].
- *Defend China’s interests more actively* [在维护中国利益方面更加积极].
- *Defend China’s interests more aggressively* [在维护中国利益方面更加具有攻击性].
- *Expand China’s influence more resolutely* [在拓展中国影响力方面更加坚定].
- *Expand China’s influence more actively* [在拓展中国影响力方面更加积极].
- *Expand China’s influence more aggressively* [在拓展中国影响力方面更加具有攻击性].
- *Don’t know* [不知道]

The results, depicted in **Figure A2**, show that while there is variation in the interpretation of this phrase, the modal survey respondent interprets it to mean “defend China’s interests more resolutely.”




Figure A2: Distribution of Respondents’ Interpretation of Assertive Chinese Foreign Policy

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